TUEBOR

We Will Protect

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT:

The Evolution of Leadership

On March 16, 1802, President Thomas Jefferson signed legislation establishing West Point as a military academy for the United States. This year's Bicentennial marks an excellent time to look back at West Point's evolution, and for police academies especially, a chance to learn from the successes and mistakes of America's preeminent Academy.

Birth and Growth

Researchers for the documentary, "West Point: The First 200 Years," describe the Academy's history as having "four seasons," in which it had its fair share of growing pains, disgraces, as well as its glorious victories. The Mexican War proved the worth of West Point — won against overwhelming odds because of West Point trained officers and their strategic know-how.

Then the Civil War split the Academy as with the country, forcing Academy friends to fight against each other. But out of this tragedy, West Point achieved its real greatness, not just because of the honor displayed on the battlefield, but because of the quick reunification of the country after the Civil War. Most of the post war leaders in the North and South were Academy alumni, and they cooperated in a spirit of integrity that helped heal the United States.

Maturity and Decay

What happened to West Point after the Civil War is analogous to what happens to most successful institutions, be they a business, government, church, or yes, police departments. With good intentions, they try to institutionalize their success by creating supporting doctrine. But as West Point learned, when "experienced" leaders retire, the doctrine turns stagnant and counterproductive.

Then West Point "let the rope out" on the cadets, hoping to develop them as leaders. But they let it out too far, and accountability slipped away. The cadet's self-discipline turned into hypocrisy and brutality. Black cadets were shunned with silence, and upper cadets "secretly" hazed new cadets, until eventually, one was even murdered. A cadet "code of silence" had replaced West Point's old code of honor.

To its misfortune, West Point found that when you don't enforce standards, a contagion of disorder sets in. And then you lose the respect of the good people, and it's nearly impossible to get back command and control. Several times Congress came close to disbanding West Point altogether because of its scandals.

When World War I came, gone were the honorable days of Robert E. Lee and Ulyses S. Grant. The officers coming out of West Point could not lead. They acted toward the civilian draftees with the same harsh disregard and selfishness they showed plebes, except for a few notable exceptions — such as Douglas MacArthur.

Because he was the son of a general, MacArthur had endured especially terrible hazing as a plebe — once having been brutalized so badly the upper cadets dumped his body in a tent and ran off, worried he would die. When he still managed to drag himself to inspection the next morn-

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ing, even the upper cadets stood in awe of him, and he was treated with respect for the remainder of the Academy. But this negative experience forged a passion in young MacArthur to someday lead his people with real honor and dignity.

Along with Patton, Douglas MacArthur was one of the few West Pointers in World War I that was admired by his men. Always showing respect to the citizen soldiers he commanded, MacArthur demanded a lot of his men, but he always led from the front, exposing himself to the same dangers and sacrifices that his men endured. MacArthur was called the "soldier's soldier" by his men because he understood them, looked out for them, and by holding them to high standards, he brought out the best in them — MacArthur could lead. As a war hero, West Point knew they had found the right man in MacArthur to reform the Academy.

West Point's Rebirth

MacArthur became Commandant of West Point in 1919 and immediately initiated reforms designed to bring discipline and honor back to the Academy. He found the fight against the cancerous under-culture to be more difficult than being in battle, and it exhausted him. To win, MacArthur created a code whereby cadets were expected to help police themselves — if cadets allowed dishonorable conduct to go unchallenged, they were held equally accountable.

But what really turned the tide was the personal relationship and trust MacArthur built with the cadets. As a hero who had demonstrated his abilities in the field, only MacArthur could establish the leadership presence that would bring command and control back to West Point. Thanks to him, the honor code of "Duty, Honor, Country" was given renewed meaning with real application.

Next, MacArthur expanded the Academy's curriculum beyond engineering to include the humanities and other sciences for a broader education and human understanding. He also made cadets spend the summer at "real" military bases working with enlisted men so they could see how the work is done and to appreciate those who do it.

In MacArthur's West Point, as seen today, cadets are given an opportunity to coach in intramural athletics, so they can be critiqued and held accountable for their leadership responsibilities.

But when it came to teaching leadership, it was MacArthur's expansion of competitive sports and athletics into West Point's culture that made the most impact. With such sports as football, baseball, basketball, track, rowing, swimming, and wrestling, West Point had a practical conduit to develop and measure those virtues of teamwork, self-discipline, fair play, and of course, leadership. West Point's current status and success is largely attributed to MacArthur's influence.

The Ups and Downs of Existence

The ups and downs of West Point's existence should not be viewed in disdain. According to organizational expert Edwin Lee, birth, growth, maturity, and decay are cycles that all organizations experience, and without these cycles, there would be no progress. While a study of management teams found that most successes are followed by major failures (usually self-initiated failures), it was also found that surviving a failure can breed success.

Like the leadership failures exhibited at West Point and in World War I that MacArthur grew from, Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell endured the leadership failure exhibited in Vietnam and then fought Desert Storm with the wisdom and anxiety that Vietnam fostered. Nothing identifies principles like living through a cultural calamity where the organization is, in effect, attacking itself.

Today, we understand natural lifecycles better. And while many organizations still fail to learn from history and die, with luck, educated leaders stand a good chance of keeping the declines to a minimum and optimizing the rebirths. With the guidance of great leaders like MacArthur, West Point and other academies will continue to survive as hallowed American institutions.



LIFECYCLES: Like West Point, all institutions go through periods of growth and decay. Whether an organization dies or is reborn depends on its leadership's ability to reestablish the principles that made it great.

The Marine Corps Teaches Law Enforcement How To Lead Community Policing

The irony is that in the effort to make law enforcement more community based and nicer, it has become less accountable and meaner

Community Policing Gets Associated With Police Corruption

The 1990s were a time of big change — technology was the focus, the economy was up, and "empowerment" was the buzzword. Everyone from police to the automotive industry was trying to find a way to build leaders at all levels of their organization; it was the culmination of the "Total Quality Management" movement that American W. E. Deming proved to be the heart of democratic enterprise.

In law enforcement, the empowerment process became synonymous with the implementation of community policing/problem solving. The result has been many creative and successful operations like school liaison programs, fugitive apprehension teams, parole violation enforcement teams, child protection specialists, and juvenile diversion, to name a few.

But amidst the community policing success stories was an increase in "rogue" misconduct by some police officers, and the 90s also became synonymous with police corruption, ineffectiveness, and excessive use of force. This erosion of police ethics and standards became detrimental to the otherwise good work of community policing.

Empowerment Without Accountability Is Anarchy

What went wrong? For some reason, the idea had spread that in order for community policing to work, officers need as much autonomy from authority as possible. Except for a few notable exception (see the article on Jack Maple in this issue), many police administrators mistakenly confused "empowerment" as being the same as "autonomy" — two very different concepts.

Government studies have now linked the erosion of police standards with the loss of accountability that autonomy brought, and "failure to supervise" and "failure to direct" became significant vicarious liability issues affecting many departments.

To prevent the "lack of accountability problem" from infecting and destroying the community policing effort, the International Association of Chiefs of Police even found it necessary to address the problem in a special report, "Police Leadership in the 21st Century:"

"The evolution of Community-Oriented Policing is far from complete ... While power must be increasingly shared, accountability and responsibility remain, and must remain!"

The confusion regarding empowerment probably occurred because most community policing models did not address accountability. Then police administrator abandoned the "old" view of command and control because it was so dysfunctional — commanders were coercive and micromanaged their subordinates, leaving them little discretion to implement community policing.

But going without command and control allows for mediocrity, abuse of force, and corruption. And now we are back with the original problem, how do we "empower" community policing while maintaining standards and accountability? In looking for an

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empowerment model that includes accountability, one organization stands out, the United States Marine Corps.

You Need A Three Part System

"Responsibility, or accountability for results, is a natural corollary of authority.

Where there is authority, there must be responsibility in like measure."

– United States Marines

UNITED STATE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL MODEL

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3

Like other organizations in the 90s, the Marines were looking for a way to encourage leadership and sound decision making at all levels. Like policing, the dynamic world of the military is ever changing, and the stakes are often high. But unlike law enforcement, the Marines developed a leadership system that started with accountability, then moved to empowerment. To accomplish this, the Marines first developed a new more dynamic command and control system, incorporated it into their existing chain-of-command, then implemented a decision making model to facilitate problem solving.

Command and Control: The Marines suggest a different and more dynamic view of "command and control" which sees COMMAND as the Empowerment of troops with AUTHORITY to solve problems. CONTROL takes the form of FEEDBACK about the effects of the action — the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander on a time needed basis. Feedback obviously comes from the officer, but should also be sought from anyone else affected or involved.

Command and control is not something that supervisors impose on subordinates, it is a "team" relationship that empowers action while maintaining "joint" accountability (see figure 1). Command and control is an "Authority > < Feedback" loop which allows the "Commander > < Trooper" relationship to adjust and modify action as needed in a continuous, cyclic process — sometimes within seconds, and sometimes within days, depending on circumstances. The aim of command and control is not to eliminate or lessen the role of people or to make people act like robots, but rather to help them perform better.

Chain-of-Command: A well-disciplined, traditional chain-of-command pyramid allows for the enforcement of high standards, as well as the coordination of action. It fixes authority, but also shares responsibility. The chain-of-command ensures checks-and-balances are in the system — big mistakes are prevented because each level of command shares accountability for the success of the operation (see figure 2). Accountability requires adequate supervision, so the span of control, or the number of subordinates or activities under a single commander, should not exceed a commander's capability to command effectively.

An orderly chain-of-command also generates "tempo." It preserves "unity of command," which serves the important function of providing group identity — as a team member at a post or unit, then as a member of a district or division, then of the larger organization. Accountability also requires that the top-holder of the chain or pyramid serve something or somebody, and in a democracy that should be the law and the public interest.

Chain-of-command also facilitates the flow of essential information up the chain so the chief can recognize patterns and formulate plans. The highest ranking commander could never digest all the information generated in the field, which is why a flat organization can be unmanageable. An efficient chain-of-command takes into account the inherent limits of human nature and, at the same time, exploits and enhances unique human skills.

In the current age, it is tempting, but a mistake, to believe that technology will replace chain-of-command. While direct, electronic, communication should be encouraged where applicable, it doesn't take the place of interpersonal supervision. The Marines quote the words of Israeli General Yshayahor Gavish, about his experience in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war: "There is no alternative to looking into a subordinate's eyes,

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

Figure 4

listening to his tone of voice." When we rely on technically transmitted information, we lose that sense of intuition that is so important to leadership.

Decision Making Model: If all officers in the chain-of-command are to be held accountable for their decisions, they must be given a tool to maximize their chances of success. The Marines developed a problem-solving formula called the "OODA loop" (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action). It is also intended to serve as a "use of force" guide, reflecting the point made in Graham v. Conner that force be "objectively reasonable" at the moment the decision is made.

The OODA loop works like this: First OBSERVE the situation and take in data — which could include scanning the scene for danger, and/or interviewing people, or conducting research, as time and opportunity allow. Having observed the situation, you next ORIENT to it — make certain estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments about the facts in order to create a cohesive mental image. Based on your orientation, you decide what to do — the DECISION may need to be an immediate reaction to danger, but if it is a prolonged plan it almost always involves the feedback from the chain of command/team. Then you put the decision into ACTION — this includes ensuring proper execution and monitoring results, which takes you full "loop" back to the observation phase (see figure 3).

Obviously, the Marines were not trying to develop a problem-solving model for community policing (police already have models like SARA and CAPRA). Problem-solving models vary according to an organization's mission, but generally speaking all models include elements for collecting information, working with others toward solving the problem, and following-up to ensure success. The point made by the Marines is, regardless of what model you use, all problem-solving must be part of the Command > < Control (authority > < feedback) loop, and the Chain-of-Command (see figure 4). This is the only "accountable" way to measure results.

Conclusion: A Continuous, Interrelated, Cyclical Process

In an interview with Dr. E. E. White, Office of Management Analysis at Headquarters Marine, he emphasized that empowerment and accountability are always a work in progress. The dynamic command and control process the Marines developed is as much about attitude, culture, and character as an organizational system. But still, it helps to have an internal system that encourages leadership.

The good thing about the Marine Corps system is that it stays focused on the mission of making command and control more effective — empowerment was a team process, and was not confused with autonomy. The Marine Corps never tried to cheat the chain-of-command — in fact, it was the old system of checks-and-balances that made leadership sharing possible. Most importantly, accountability was always part of the formula — increased problem solving authority also meant increased communication with supervisors.

Police officers themselves want strong command and control — usually you will find that their biggest complaint is "the department is letting standards slip!" We start a police officer's career with the rigors of a paramilitary academy, to get them accustomed to the virtues of accountability, chain-of-command, and problem-solving, and they naturally defend this tradition sensing the necessity of duty and self-discipline. The lesson here is of responsibility, NOT that the police should be just like the military.

A far cry from a military dictatorship, the Marines emphasize leadership at every level. Their dynamic command and control system is not demeaning, and it becomes controlling only to the extent necessary to uphold standards when they are not being met. Fortunate for police, the Marines have created an empowerment/accountability model that law enforcement can also use as community policing progresses into the new century.

The entire U.S. Marine Corps document on Command and Control can be found at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcdp6/toc.htm. The International Association of Chiefs of Police also has two relevant reports: "Police Leadership in the 21st Century" found at http://theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/policeleadership.pdf, and "Police Accountabiliity and Citizen Review" found at http://theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/policeaccountability.pdf

Broken Windows and the Cops that Fix Them:

Remembering Jack Maple

It's been about a year since Jack Maple died (August 4th, 2001) of colon cancer. He was only 48. Police are faithful in honoring their own, and Jack should be remembered for his part in developing and popularizing the strategy responsible for greatly reducing crime throughout America. Community policing, police problem solving, and many other variants are all based on this strategy. But when Maple was just starting things off, the strategy was known simply as the "Broken Windows Theory."

The Broken Windows Theory was first expressed by political scientist James Q. Wilson and criminologist George Kelling in an article for The Atlantic Monthly in 1982. The theory holds that if someone breaks a window in a building and it is not quickly repaired, others will be emboldened to break more windows. Eventually, the broken windows create a sense of disorder that attracts criminals, who thrive in conditions of public apathy and neglect.

The theory was based on an experiment conducted by Stanford University psychologist Philip Zimbardo. He took two identical cars, placing one on a street in a middle-class Palo Alto neighborhood and the other in a tougher neighborhood in the Bronx. The car in the Bronx, which had no license plate on it and was parked with its hood up, was stripped within a day. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for a week, until Zimbardo smashed one of its windows with a sledgehammer. Within a few hours, it was stripped.

The New York Police Department was the first major agency to take the Broken Windows lesson and employ it in their enforcement philosophy, largely as a result of one police officer showing that it worked — Jack Maple. Jack was only a lieutenant in the city's Transit Police when Police Commissioner William J. Bratton recognized he was doing something special.

Jack was convinced that disorder was a key ingredient in the steeply rising robbery rate, as criminals of opportunity, including many youthful offenders, looked upon the subway as a place where they could get away with anything. By strictly enforcing lesser offenses, Maple helped solve as well as deter more serious crimes.

Recognizing Maple's genius and commitment, Bratton took a chance and promoted Jack right up to Deputy Commissioner. It paid off. A student of military history, Maple used "crime-mapping" to aim police resources, like Britain used radar against Nazi bombers. Maple was the guy who put "enforcement" in community policing.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf once said: "I don't want any troops put at risk to cover the asses of officers who failed to do the job in the first place." Maple obviously agreed with this. Known for his persistence, Maple held in depth weekly meetings with his precinct commanders — going over their precinct's performance — "strongly" encouraging the commanders to get out and lead.

In the 1990s, Jack Maple was one of the few community policing advocates who emphasized strict accountability — at "all" levels. A lot of the excessive force and corruption scandals that NYPD became involved in occurred "after" Jack had retired. (Read Jack Maple's views on police ethics, in response to the Abner Louimia scandal, in the Summer 1999 Tuebor, at www.michigan.gov/msp under publications).

Even though he became renown for his administrative abilities, at heart Maple was always a hard-nosed street cop. He became the youngest detective in the department when promoted at age 27. He personally made hundreds of arrests, and was once hit on the head by a man wielding an iron pipe. He would fearlessly chase dangerous suspects out of the subways and into the streets in order to make an arrest, irking bosses who resented the extra paperwork.

The main character in "The District," a television police drama, was modeled on Maple. Bratton called Maple the smartest man on crime matters he ever met. Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani said, "Jack was one of the truly great innovators in law enforcement who helped to make New York City the safest large city in America." Before succumbing to his illness, Jack Maple completed and published the book *The Crimefighters,* now a must-read for all serious police officers and criminal justice students. Here's to you Jack: Thanks for helping give law enforcement back its pride and effectiveness.

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